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Abstract
This paper shows that the recent surge in savings is a result of tighter
macroprudential policy. Using a dierence-in-dierences approach with stag-
gered treatment adoption, we nd that households in EU countries that adopted
macroprudential policy between 2000 and 2019 increased their savings up to
one third more than households in countries without macroprudential policy.
Furthermore, our results indicate that the loan-to-value ratio explains most of
the variation on savings. Finally, we nd that a longer exposure to macropru-
dential policy exacerbates savings with searing consequences on growth.
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1 Introduction
Why is it that near or zero interest rates coexist with exuberant savings rates? In
the wake of the Great Recession, it was brought to the fore that interest rates and
savings should move in tandem (e.g., Guierrieri and Lorenzoni, 2011; Eggertsson
and Krugman, 2011; Hall, 2011; Carroll et al., 2019). But if the interest rate is
the only driver of savings, then savings should have crept downward in line with
the recent decline in the interest rate. That households continue to save, regardless
of loose monetary policy, suggests that current economic theory is not telling us
the entire story. Admittedly, any factor that alters the relationship between the
interest rate and credit could inuence savings. Recent empirical research shows that
tighter macroprudential policy curtails lending with deleterious eects on growth
(e.g., Lim et al., 2011; Cerutti et al., 2017). Reconciling both views means that
sounder underwriting standards may induce agents to save more to meet the tighter
requirements.
This paper investigates whether the recent surge in savings is the result of tighter
macroprudential policy. Our basic argument is that macroprudential policy has the
ability to drive savings or, better yet, that macroprudential policy is intrinsically
intertwined with spending. To thoroughly test this argument, we use a dierence-
in-dierences (DiD) approach that exploits the staggered timing of macroprudential
policy adoption in the EU from 2000 to 2019. Our main nding is that households
in countries that implement macroprudential policies increase their savings between
1,4% and 3,1% more than households in countries without macroprudential regu-
lation. Moreover, we nd that restrictions to credit based on the Loan-to-Value
(LTV) ratio explain most of the variation in savings. Lastly, we show that a longer
exposure to macroprudential policy exacerbates the eect on savings.
We also rule out alternative explanations for the sustained surge in savings.
One could argue that the increase in savings is potentially being driven by agents
rebuilding their balance sheets after the Great Recession or even by pessimism about
the economy. To address these issues, we split our sample into pre- and post-crisis
periods. Not only do we nd that macroprudential policy explains the recent rise
in savings, but we also provide evidence that macroprudential policy drove savings
up in the halcyon years preceding the Great Recession. This supports our argument
that macroprudential policy is a key driver of savings.
Much of the existing literature focuses on the impact of macroprudential policy
on nancial stability. Instead, we examine how its eects ramify throughout the
economy by reconciling the existing theoretical and empirical work on the comple-
mentarity of macroprudential and monetary policy. In particular, we show that
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savings are an important transmission channel through which macroprudential pol-
icy aects growth. In many ways, our ndings are consistent with the credit view
proposed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988). This strand of research suggests that an
increase in the interest rate leads to credit rationing with pernicious eects for the
economy; we, too, provide evidence that tighter macroprudential policy is at the
root of the recent reduction in spending that imperils growth. If macroprudential
policy makes it increasingly more dicult for households to borrow, they may never
enjoy the more favourable borrowing conditions. A major implication of this nd-
ing is that, at least in the context of loose interest rate policies, macroprudential
policy may play a more decisive role to spur credit. So, while we agree with the
view that macroprudential policy can serve as a bulwark against nancial instability,
our results emphasize that policy makers should also consider the trade-o between
growth and stability when choosing newfangled instruments.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, we are among the rst to implement a
wide-scale DiD with staggered treatment adoption in a policy setting. Building on
the work of Callaway and Sant'Anna (2020)1, we exploit the timing dierences in
the adoption of macroprudential policy across Europe. This method allows us to
assess the causal impact of macroprudential policy in disparate groups at dierent
points in time. Moreover, we are able to compute an aggregate estimator that
circumvents the challenge of interpreting multiple individual parameters in a large
sample. Others could follow a similar approach to study policy implementation.
This paper is divided into four sections. Section I sets the stage by briey
discussing the existing literature. Section II explains the method and describes the
data. Section III presents the empirical results. Section IV concludes.
2 Literature review
Our work is closely related to the recent literature on the impact of credit supply
on savings. This nascent work is mainly theoretical, but it suggests that credit-
loosening policies can trigger a hike in savings. For example, Carroll et al. (2019)
argue that savings are driven by a gap between actual and target wealth, which is
determined by credit conditions and uncertainty. In addition, they nd that credit
availability explains most of the long-term variation in savings and that uctuations
in net wealth and uncertainty have profound implications on the business-cycle.
Relatedly, Guierrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) introduce durables in a DGE model with
heterogeneous agents and nd that a credit crunch is associated with an increment in
1We also estimate our models using the "did" package in R built by these authors.
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savings. Moreover, Eggertsson and Krugman (2011) examine a deleveraging shock
in a simple New Keynesian model to show that borrowers take on less debt today
to accumulate more savings tomorrow. Worse yet, they argue that deleveraging
can reduce the interest rate further and cause a steep increase in savings. In a
similar vein, Hall (2011) shows that tighter credit leads to higher savings because the
reduction in consumption by constrained households more than osets the increase
in consumption by unconstrained households. Altogether, the theoretical literature
suggests that credit supply has a signicant inuence on savings.
If the credit supply aects savings, then any policy that curbs or spurs credit
may have the ability to drive savings. Previous literature is focused on the impact of
conventional monetary policy on credit supply (Bernanke and Blinder, 1998). This
credit view of monetary policy asserts that reducing credit supply can leave the
economy teetering on the edge (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Ciccarelli et al., 2015).
While the eects of monetary policy on credit are hard to overstate, they are hardly
the only driver of savings.
Yet, most of the theoretical literature still assumes that the eect of credit sup-
ply on savings is only a function of the policy rate2. Recent empirical research,
however, emphasizes the role of macroprudential policy on credit supply. In an
inuential study, Lim et al. (2011) show that targeted macroprudential policies
like the LTV and the Debt-Service-to-Income (DSTI) ratios are eective tools to
tame credit. Relatedly, Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015) conrm these results
and extend them by looking at the cumulative impact of LTV and DSTI on credit
growth. Finally, Cerutti et al. (2017) perform an extensive cross-country analysis
using panel regressions and they nd that borrower-based macroprudential policies
are important tools to constrain credit. Interestingly, the authors also highlight that
macroprudential policies are particularly eective to curtail lending during boom pe-
riods. Overall, the empirical evidence indicates that macroprudential policy reduces
the supply of loans.
By linking the theory on credit and savings with the empirical evidence that
macroprudential policy constrains credit, we investigate if the imposition of stricter
prudential boundaries explains the sustained surge in savings. It is to these matters
that we turn next.
2The few exceptions highlight the complementary role of monetary and macroprudential policy
in curbing nancial instability. For example, Borio and Shim (2007) nd that macroprudential
policy should be used to counteract instability when the ability of monetary policy to lean against
the wind is limited. These results are consistent with the DGE model proposed by Angelini et
al. (2011) that shows that macroprudential policy should support monetary policy in response to
shocks that pose a dire threat to stability. Notwithstanding, none of these papers directly relates




Our methodology closely follows that of Callaway and Sant'Anna (2020). Assume
there are T periods where t = 1, . . . , T andDt is a binary variable that equals 1 when
a country implements a macroprudential policy in quarter t and 0 otherwise. Let's
dene Gg equal to 1 when a country is rst treated in quarter g and 0 otherwise.
Also, let's assign C equal to 1 to the countries that never implement a household-
targeted macroprudential policy in our sample (i.e., never-treated countries) and 0
otherwise. This implies that each country in the sample has exactly one Gg or C
equal to 13.
Then, we can dene the generalized propensity score pg(X) as the probability
that a country is treated conditional on having covariates X and belonging to group
g or the control group, i.e., pg(X) = P (Gg = 1|X,Gg + C = 1). Thus, the observed
outcome in each period t is estimated as follows:
Yt = DtYt(1) + (1−Dt)Yt(0) (1)
where Yt(1) and Yt(0) are the potential outcomes in time t with and without treat-
ment, respectively.
In contrast to a standard dierence-in-dierences approach, our main causal
parameter of interest is a group-time average treatment eect (ATT (g, t)). Put
simply, the ATT (g, t) is the average treatment eect experienced by group g in
time t with 'group' being dened as the rst period in which household-targeted
macroprudential policies were implemented. It is estimated as below:
ATT (g, t) = E[Yt(1)− Yt(0)|Gg = 1] (2)
In our panel data setup, the ATT for group g in period t can be nonparametrically
identied and estimated as following4:













We are particularly interested in studying how the eect of macroprudential
policy changes by group and time. Yet, making inference based on several dierent
3The staggered DiD assigns to the treated group the countries that adopted at least one macro-
prudential tool and to the control group the countries that never implemented any tool.
4Assuming (conditional) parallel trends, irreversibility of treatment and covariate overlap. See
Callaway and Sant'Anna (2020) for additional details.
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ATT (g, t) is often troublesome (if not impossible). Therefore, we aggregate the
ATT (g, t) to obtain fewer causal eect parameters, which are easier to interpret.
These parameters are unbiased and consistent estimates of the treatment eect of
each group5.
In our setting, there are two main drawbacks related to the aggregation of the
ATT (g, t). For starters, the estimator may be biased due to selective treatment tim-
ing. Since countries choose the timing of implementation of macroprudential tools,
those who implement earlier may also experience earlier the eects of being treated.
Thus, combining the ATT (g, t) across g and t using a simple average may overweight
the eect of early-treated groups with more observations in post-treatment periods.
As a means of getting around this problem, we compute the ATT (g, t) specic to
each treated group and we average them across all post-treatment periods:
θ̃S(g) =
1
τ − g + 1
τ∑
t=2
1{g ≤ t}ATT (g, t) (4)
We then estimate the "overall ATT", θS, by aggregating the group-specic treat-




θ̃S(g)P (G = g) (5)
Equation (6) is our summary measure of the eect of adopting macroprudential
policy without overweighting the eect of the earlier-treated groups. This group
parameter is an unbiased estimate of the impact of macroprudential policy on each
treated group. Another potential drawback is that the eect of macroprudential
policy on savings may be dynamic. For example, one may expect larger eects of
macroprudential policy on savings in later periods. To account for the presence of
dynamic treatment eects, we average the group-time ATT into treatment eects






1{t− g + 1 = e}ATT (g, t)P (G = g|t− g + 1 = e) (6)
where e is the length of exposure to treatment. Finally, we average θD over all
5Not only is this likely to increase statistical signicance, but it also reduces estimation un-
certainty. See Wooldridge (2005), Goodman-Bacon (2018) and Athey and Imbens (2018) for an
in-depth discussion.
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Equation (7) is our summary measure for the dynamic treatment eects. It is
worth noting that the main dierence between θD and θS is in the weights: θD
puts more emphasis on ATT (g,t) when g is signicantly less than t. This en-
ables groups with a longer exposure to macroprudential policy to be weighted more
because we have few groups with longer periods of exposure. In the absence of
selective treatment timing, the dynamic eects estimator captures the evolution of
macroprudential policy eects over time.
Finally, we also run alternative model specications that ensure that the parallel
trends assumption holds conditional on a number of covariates deemed relevant in
the literature. By construction, these covariates should be time invariant and aect
savings, while remaining unaected by macroprudential policy6. In any case, the
results of our main model have a causal interpretation that remains valid under the
unconditional or the conditional parallel trends assumption. This can be inspected
visually in Figure 2 or using the Cramér-von Mises (CvM) test for the conditional
parallel pre-trends assumption. The CvM approach is particularly suitable to our
setting because we have heterogenous treatment groups. We nd compelling evi-
dence to not reject the unconditional parallel trends assumption (p-value: 0.953)
nor the conditional parallel trends assumption (p-value: 0.948). This provides reas-
suring evidence that we can interpret a causal impact of macroprudential policy on
household savings7.
3.2 Data
Our empirical setting uses quarterly data on 21 European countries covering the
period 2000:Q1 to 2019:Q48. Our main variables of interest are household gross
savings and an indicator of household-targeted macroprudential policy. Later, we
consider other potential explanatory variables in a number of robustness tests.
6When covariates are not time invariant, the "did" package in R sets the value of the covariate
equal to the rst quarter in the sample.
7Furthermore, our data does not suer from stationarity issues. Results of Maddala and Wu test
(Maddala and Wu, 1999) as well as the Pesaran test (Pesaran, 2007) are available in appendices.
8Our initial dataset comprises the 27 member states of the European Union and the United
Kingdom. We exclude Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg and Lithuania because households' gross sav-
ings exhibit severe swings. Additionally, Bulgaria, Greece and Romania are removed because
household gross savings data is missing in the pre-treatment and/or post-treatment periods. Thus,
our nal dataset covers 21 countries from 2000:Q1 to 2019:Q4.
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Figure 1: Gross Household Savings (%) during 2000-2019
Note: The y-axis compares the gross household savings rate to the policy rate and the x-axis
is the number of quarters in our sample.
The household gross savings was collected from Eurostat's national accounts. It
is dened as gross savings divided by gross disposable income with the latter being
adjusted for the change in net equity of households in pension funds reserves. This
data was readily available for most of the countries in the sample; when missing, it
was interpolated from the annual series using a standard quadratic interpolation9.
In Figure 1, we can see that household savings continued to increase amid the low
interest rates during this period. The hike in the savings rate around quarter 40
corresponds to the period of the Great Recession and it may reect a precautionary
motive. The savings rate kept increasing rapidly in the period post-crisis and it is
now signicantly higher than in the pre-crisis period.
The variable on household-targeted macroprudential policy was built from the
IMF iMaPP database on macroprudential policies (Alam et al., 2019)and updated
with information from the ECB Macroprudential Bulletins. We assigned to the
treated groups all the countries that implemented a macroprudential instrument
targeting households' access to credit during this period, particularly LTV and DSTI
9Household gross savings was only interpolated for Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Hun-
gary and Latvia. In the robustness checks, we omit Croatia because data is not available at the
beginning of the series for the period 2000-2008.
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ratios or loan restrictions10. As a result, the treated group in our main model
contains 16 countries corresponding to 76% of the sample. The control group in
our mail model is composed of countries that never implement a household-targeted
macroprudential tool.
Although our sample of EU countries is fairly homogeneous, we consider the pos-
sibility that there may be covariate-specic trends in savings across groups. There-
fore, we collect data on a number of factors that may vary across EU countries and
that could potentially explain the variation on household gross savings. Our choice
of explanatory variables is grounded on the existing literature11, which suggests that
monetary policy, government spending and households' income may also explain part
of the variation on savings12. Our choice of explanatory variables is grounded on the
existing literature, which suggests that monetary policy, government spending and
households' income may also explain part of the variation on savings. To account
for these possibilities, we run alternative specications of our model that include
the policy rate collected from the IMF IFS; the government budget balance from
the ECB Macroprudential Database (MPDB); and the households' gross disposable
income also available at the ECB MPDB13.
4 Results
4.1 Main Results
Table 1 provides the results from our baseline DiD model. In this model, the
main dependent variable is the household gross savings rate. Column 1 presents
the results when the control group is composed by countries that have never im-
plemented macroprudential (i.e., "never treated"); additionally, these results are
10We follow an approach similar to Lim et al. (2011) that focuses on policy tools that target
banks' exposure to household risks, namely the LTV ratio, DSTI ratio and other loan restrictions.
11Other potential factors aecting the savings rate include stock market volatility and unem-
ployment. It is worth noting that, by construction, the DiD may produce spurious results if we
introduce covariates that can inuence macroprudential policy. Given that macroprudential tools
are often implemented in response to greater volatility in the markets and also variability in un-
employment, we opt to run panel regressions with xed eects to test the role played by these
factors. The results obtained are in line with our estimations from the DiD (available on request).
These results are not unexpected. After all, our sample is composed of EU countries that are fairly
homogeneous and whose capital and labor markets usually move in the same direction.
12Countries with higher interest rates tend to benet savers at the expense of borrowers (e.g.,
Coibion et al., 2017). Also, it is a stylized fact that Ricardian agents increase their savings when the
government runs a budget decit (Barro, 1974). Lastly, the marginal propensity to save increases
with income (e.g., Dynan et al., 2004).
13Detailed descriptions and sources of the data are available in Appendix A.
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estimated using the doubly robust method 14 and are aggregated by group. The re-
maining columns present the results using alternative specications for the control
group15, the estimation method and the aggregation 16.
Broadly speaking, we nd that the adoption of macroprudential policy is as-
sociated with a sharp increase in the gross household savings rate. This result is
statistically signicant in every model specication. In our main model, with no
covariates, we nd that macroprudential policy results in a 1.91% increment in the
gross household savings rate. The size of the impact is surprisingly consistent across
models - ranging from 1.39% to 3.10% - and it is only marginally lower when we
increase the size of the control group to include not yet treated countries. If we
consider that the average savings rate for both treated and non-treated countries
in our sample is approximately 10.27%, this corresponds to an increase of up to
one third in savings. These results corroborate our hypothesis that households in-
creased their savings over and above what they would have had had they not faced
macroprudential regulation.
As discussed earlier, a potential concern with our analysis is that we may over-
weight the early-treated groups. To address this issue, we compute each treated
group's ATT (g, t) and we then average them across all post-treatment periods.
The group eects of macroprudential policy on savings under unconditional par-
allel trends range from -2.70% to 8.45%, but they are mainly positive: only 1 out
of 13 group eects was found negative and statistically signicant, which contrasts
sharply with the 8 positive group eects that are statistically signicant. On the
whole, there is a statistically signicant positive impact of macroprudential policy
on household gross savings.
Figure 2 displays the "dynamic" impact of macroprudential policy on savings
under unconditional parallel trends. Figure 2 shows that the eect on household
savings remains largely positive across time and indeed becomes stronger as the
14The ATT is computed using OLS regression to calculate the dierence between the treated
and the control groups for each observation. These dierences are then weighted according to the
probability of each observation occurring. This method does not extrapolate and it avoids the
weaknesses associated with individual OLS and IPW.
15In the main model, we use a pool of countries in our control group who never implement
macroprudential policy throughout the sample period. In addition, we can force the control group
to include the countries that did not implement macroprudential policy at the time of "treatment".
This increases the size of the control group at the expense of treatment heterogeneity (Sant'Anna
and Marcus, 2020). Results remain consistent regardless of the control group specication.
16To circumvent the issue of earlier treatment groups being overweighted, we aggregate using
group and dynamic eects. Our main model uses group aggregation, which allows us to see the
group specic eect of macroprudential policy on savings. Using dynamic aggregation as an alter-
native specication enables us to study the impact of lengthening the duration of macroprudential
policy.
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Table 1: Results from the Baseline Model
Model I II III IV V
Period 2000-2019 2000-2019 2000-2019 2000-2019 2000-2019
Treatment Group Never Treated Not Yet Treated Never Treated Not Yet Treated Never Treated
Estimation Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Regression
Aggregation Group Group Dynamic Dynamic Group
Dependent Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings
Covariates - - - - Disposable Income
ATT 1.91% 1.74% 3.10% 2.98% 1.39%
Stat. Signicant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports the aggregated group treatment eect (ATT(g,t)) parameters esti-
mated in Eq. (4) under both the unconditional and the conditional parallel trends assumption to
evaluate the impact of macroprudential policy on savings across groups. The aggregated dynamic
treatment eect parameters under unconditional parallel trends are also reported to evaluate the
impact of macroprudential policy on savings over time. ATT(g,t) is the average treatment eect
experienced by group g in time t. Statistical signicance is reported at a 5% level.
length of exposure to macroprudential policy also increases17. On the whole, these
results lend support to the argument that households save more in response to tighter
macroprudential regulation.
As discussed earlier, a potential concern with our analysis is that we may over-
weight the early-treated groups. To address this issue, we compute each treated
group's ATT (g,t) and we then average them across all post-treatment periods.
The group eects of macroprudential policy on savings under unconditional paral-
lel trends range from -2.70% to 8.45%, but they are mainly positive: only 1 out
of 13 group eects was found negative and statistically signicant, which contrasts
sharply with the 8 positive group eects that are statistically signicant. On the
whole, there is a statistically signicant positive impact of macroprudential policy
on household gross savings.
17One should interpret these ndings with care. It is worth noting that the dynamic impact of
macroprudential policy on savings only becomes statistically signicant after several quarters. In
general, though, this impact is positive and increases over time, which corroborates our results.
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Figure 2: Group Impact of Macroprudential Policy Under Unconditional Parallel
Trends
Note: The x-axis is the length of exposure to the treatment. Length of exposure equal to 0
provides the average eect of implementing macroprudential policy across groups in the time period
when they rst implement macroprudential policy (instantaneous treatment eect). Length of ex-
posure equal to -1 corresponds to the time period before groups implement macroprudential policy,
and length of exposure equal to 1 corresponds to the rst time period after initial implementation.
Figure 2 displays the "dynamic" impact of macroprudential policy on savings
under unconditional parallel trends. It shows that the eect on household savings
remains largely positive across time and indeed becomes stronger as the length of ex-
posure to macroprudential policy also increases18. This dynamic eect lends support
to the argument that households save more in response to tighter macroprudential
regulation; but they also emphasize the need for policy makers to continuously ad-
just the macroprudential stance due to a potential snowballing eect on savings.
18One should interpret these ndings with care. It is worth noting that the dynamic impact of
macroprudential policy on savings only becomes statistically signicant after several quarters. In
general, though, this impact is positive and increases over time, which corroborates our results.
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4.2 Individual Policy Choices
In this subsection, we disaggregate the eect of individual household-targeted
macroprudential instruments. This enables us to determine the instruments that
a more important role in driving savings. In particular, we look separately at the
LTV ratio and the loan restrictions . To study the individual policy choices, we
need to ensure that the treated country has not yet implemented one of the other
household policy choices at the time of treatment. Additionally, the country should
only implement a single household targeted policy in that period to ensure that we
can properly disaggregate the impact of the individual policy choice.
Tables 2 and 3 presents the results of the impact of LTV ratios and loan re-
strictions on savings, respectively. We nd that LTV ratios result in an increase in
savings between 2.46% and 4.4%. In contrast, loan restrictions lead to a decrease in
savings of roughly 0.61%. The impact of the LTV ratio is statistically signicant in
all cases, while the impact of loan restrictions is not. In summary, we nd suggestive
evidence that the increase in household savings may be driven rst and foremost
by macroprudential tools that explicitly restrict the amount borrowed, such as the
LTV ratio.
Table 2: Results for LTV Ratios
Model I II III IV V
Period 2000-2019 2000-2019 2000-2019 2000-2019 2000-2019
Macroprudential Instrument LTV LTV LTV LTV LTV
Treatment Group Never Treated Not Yet Treated Never Treated Not Yet Treated Never Treated
Estimation Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Regression
Aggregation Group Group Dynamic Dynamic Group
Dependent Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings
Covariates - - - - Disposable Income
ATT 3.44% 3.37% 4.4% 4.35% 2.46%
Stat. Signicant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports the aggregated group treatment eect (ATT) parameters estimated in
Eq. (4) under both the unconditional and the conditional parallel trends assumption to evaluate
the impact of LTV ratios on savings across groups. The aggregated dynamic treatment eect
parameters under unconditional parallel trends are also reported to evaluate the impact of LTV
ratios on savings over time. ATT(g,t) is the average treatment eect experienced by group g in
time t. Statistical signicance is reported at a 5% level.
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Table 3: Results for Loan Restrictions
Model I II III IV V
Period 2000-2019 2000-2019 2000-2019 2000-2019 2000-2019
Macroprudential Instrument Loan Restrictions Loan Restrictions Loan Restrictions Loan Restrictions Loan Restrictions
Treatment Group Never Treated Not Yet Treated Never Treated Not Yet Treated Never Treated
Estimation Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Doubly Robust
Aggregation Group Group Dynamic Dynamic Group
Dependent Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings
Covariates - - - - Disposable Income
ATT -0.61% -0.53% -0.40% -0.32% -0.78%
Stat. Signicant No No No No No
Note: The table reports the aggregated group treatment eect (ATT) parameters estimated in
Eq. (4) under both the unconditional and the conditional parallel trends assumption to evaluate
the impact of loan restrictions on savings across groups. The aggregated dynamic treatment
eect parameters under unconditional parallel trends are also reported to evaluate the impact of
LTV ratios and loan restrictions on savings over time. ATT(g,t) is the average treatment eect
experienced by group g in time t. Statistical signicance is reported at a 5% level.
Table 2 presents the results of impact of LTV ratios and loan restrictions on sav-
ings. Models I to V look at the impact of LTV ratios on household savings. Models
VI to X look at the impact of loan restrictions on savings. We nd that LTV ratios
result in an increase in savings between 3.35% and 5.27%. Loan restrictions lead to
a decrease in savings of roughly 0.5%. The impact of the LTV ratio is statistically
signicant in all cases. The impact of loan restrictions is not. In summary, the
increase in household savings is being driven by LTV ratios. In general, macropru-
dential policy measures that restrict lending to particular sectors play an important
role in curbing credit. Thus, measures that restrict the access to lending play an
important role in the savings surge.
4.3 Robustness checks
Up to this point, this paper has shown that the persistent increase in savings
is likely a result of tighter macroprudential policy. Yet, several other factors may
be driving the increase in savings during this period. For example, households may
be rebalancing their balance sheets following the Great recession or they may be
pessimistic about the prospects of the economy.
To address these issues, we divide our sample into pre- and post-crisis periods
as a robustness check. By studying the period pre-crisis as well as the period post-
crisis, we can rule out the possibility that the soaring savings are only a consequence
of low consumer condence or balance sheet rebalancing.
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Table 4: Results for 2000-2008 and 2010-2019
Model I II III IV V VI VII
Period 2000-2008 2000-2008 2000-2008 2000-2008 2000-2008 2000-2008 2000-2008
Treatment Group Never Treated Not Yet Treated Never Treated Not Yet Treated Never Treated Never Treated Never Treated
Estimation Method Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Regression Regression Regression
Aggregation Method Group Group Dynamic Dynamic Group Group Group
Dependent Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings
Covariates - - - - Policy Rate Disposable Income Government Decit
ATT 1.15% 1.22% -0.13% -0.05% 1.30% 0.53% 1.30%
Statistically Signicant Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes
Note: The table reports the aggregated group treatment eect (ATT) parameters estimated in
Eq. (4) under both the unconditional and the conditional parallel trends assumption to evaluate
the impact of macroprudential policy on savings across groups for the pre-crisis period. The aggre-
gated dynamic treatment eect parameters under unconditional parallel trends are also reported
to evaluate the impact of macroprudential policy on savings over time for the pre-crisis period.
ATT(g,t) is the average treatment eect experienced by group g in time t. Statistical signicance
is reported at a 5% level.
Table 5: Results for 2010-2019
Model IX X XI XII XIV XV XVI
Period 2010-2019 2010-2019 2010-2019 2010-2019 2010-2019 2010-2019 2010-2019
Treatment Group Never Treated Not Yet Treated Never Treated Not Yet Treated Never Treated Never Treated Never Treated
Estimation Method Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Doubly Robust Regression Regression
Aggregation Method Group Group Dynamic Dynamic Group Group Group
Dependent Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings Gross Savings




ATT 0.90% 0.86% 1.2% 1.16% 0.75% 0.85% 0.91%
Statistically Signicant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table reports the aggregated group treatment eect (ATT) parameters estimated in
Eq. (4) under both the unconditional and the conditional parallel trends assumption to evaluate
the impact of macroprudential policy on savings across groups for the post-crisis period. The aggre-
gated dynamic treatment eect parameters under unconditional parallel trends are also reported
to evaluate the impact of macroprudential policy on savings over time for the post-crisis period.
ATT(g,t) is the average treatment eect experienced by group g in time t. Statistical signicance
is reported at a 5% level.
Tables 4 and 5 present the results for the pre-crisis period and post-crisis periods,
respectively. Our estimations reveal that macroprudential policy resulted in a 1.15%
increase in gross household savings in the pre-crisis period and a 0.90% increase in
the gross household savings rate post-crisis period. Ergo, the increase in savings
is positive and statistically signicant. As one would expect, our results suggest
that the panic sowed by the Great Recession triggered a rise in savings; nonetheless,
savings grew unabated in the period following the crisis, which suggests that panic
cannot be the factor driving savings. Moreover, we would like to point out that
households only rebalance their balance sheets in the aftermath of a crisis; yet, our
results show that macroprudential policy already explains the surge in savings before
the crisis took place. Although we do not attempt to provide indisputable evidence
on this matter, our DiD with multiple time periods in the pre-crisis period shows that
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savings respond positively to tighter macroprudential requirements. These results
hold regardless of the choice of treatment group, covariates and estimation methods.
Finally, an unintended consequence of our model choice is that we cannot cap-
ture the eects of either loosening or removing a policy. For instance, our results
may vary when we consider the overall number of macroprudential policies adopted
in the country or the intensity of these requirements. To validate our results, we run
a panel regression of savings on a cumulative index of household targeted macropru-
dential policy . We nd that a one unit increase in the number of macroprudential
tools spurs savings between 5% to 11%. Overall, these results are consistent with
our previous ndings and provides additional evidence that macroprudential policy
drives household savings.
5 Conclusion
The recent surge in savings amid low interest rates emphasizes the need for theory
to examine why interest rates may sometimes fail to drive spending. This paper
focuses on the role of macroprudential policy and its eects on savings. Using a DiD
approach with multiple groups and time periods, we show that credit restrictions
imposed by macroprudential policy are inextricably intertwined with the sustained
surge in savings.
We do not intend to survey the whole collection of factors that aect savings
through credit nor do we contend that macroprudential policy is some deus ex
machina explanation for the increase in savings. We do, however, provide compelling
evidence that macroprudential policy is a key driver of savings, particularly in the
context of low interest rates. Going forward, DGE models and empirical work could
oer alternative explanations by disentangling the eects of the interest rate from
other factors that restrict access to credit.
In addition, some limitations of our method point to potential research oppor-
tunities. First, our DiD approach assumes that a country becomes treated as soon
as it implements a macroprudential policy; however, our model does not fully ex-
plore the eects of a change in the overall macroprudential stance. For example,
it would be interesting to separate the eects of tightening, loosening or removing
macroprudential policies on households' savings. Further, when we run separate
DiDs for each individual instrument, we nd suggestive evidence that the type of
instrument determines the response of households. Thus, understanding the role of
macroprudential tools on savings remains a potentially fruitful area for research.
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Notwithstanding, we have shown that savings are an important transmission
channel through which macroprudential policy aects growth. In fact, we nd that
a longer exposure to macroprudential policy amplies the eect on savings with a
detrimental impact on growth. These results have profound implications for policy
makers trying to halt a crisis. While macroprudential policy may be an eective
tool to curb instability, it can also grip the economy when left unattended. As
macroprudential policy has the ability to drive savings, policy makers should be




Variable Type Source Details
HH_Gross_savings_rate Dependent Eurostat Gross saving (B8G) divided by gross dis-
posable income adjusted for changes in
pension entitlements (B6G + D8net); Sea-
sonally and calendar adjusted. Quarterly
data.
Policy_rate Control IMF IFS Central Bank Policy Rate; Short-term in-
terest rate (%). Quarterly data.
Gov_budget_balance Control ECB MPDB The government surplus/decit is equal to
revenue minus expenditure. Net lending
(pos) / net borrowing (neg). Ratio to gross
domestic product. Neither seasonally ad-
justed nor calendar adjusted - ESA 2010.
Quarterly data.
Gross_disposable_income_YoY Control ECB MPDB Gross national income (at market prices)
+ current transfers receivable by resident
units from the rest of the world - cur-
rent transfers payable to non-resident units
from the rest of the world. Neither season-
ally adjusted nor calendar adjusted - ESA
2010. Per capita, year-on-year growth rate.
Quarterly data.
LoanR_HH Policy IMF iMaPP Household loan restrictions which include
loan limits and may be conditioned on loan
characteristics like the maturity, the size,
the type of interest rate and the LTV ratio.
Index cumulated to a quarterly frequency.
LTV Policy IMF iMaPP Limits to the loan-to-value ratios, includ-
ing those mostly targeted at housing loans,
but also includes those targeted at auto-
mobile loans, and commercial real estate
loans. Index cumulated to a quarterly fre-
quency.
DSTI Policy IMF iMaPP Limits to the debt-service-to-income ratio
and the loan-to-income ratio, which re-
strict the size of debt services or debt rel-
ative to income. They include those tar-
geted at housing loans, consumer loans,
and commercial real estate loans. Index
cumulated to a quarterly frequency.
Note: Data sources as well as the details of each variable included in our analysis.
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B Unit Root Tests
Maddala and Wu Test (Maddala and Wu, 1999) for the Presence of a Unit Root
H0: Presence of a Unit Root
Observations Statistic P-Value
Policy Rate 1680 69.200 0.005
hh_gross_savings_rate 1680 184.765 0.0000
gov_decit 1652 810.475 0.0000
gross_disposable_income_yoy 1680 864.993 0.0000
Pesaran Test (Pesaran, 2007) for the Presence of a Unit Root
H0: Presence of a Unit Root
Observations Statistic P-Value
Policy Rate 1680 -6.716 0.0000
hh_gross_savings_rate 1680 -3.699 0.0000
gov_decit 1652 -20.320 0.0000
gross_disposable_income_yoy 1680 -16.043 0.0000
Note: First generation Maddala and Wu Test for panel unit roots (Maddala and Wu, 1999)
results based on: Ho: All panels contain unit roots and Ha: At least one panel is stationary.
The results of an Inverse Chi-squared test are presented in the above table with both the Test
Statistic as well as the p-value being quoted. The presence of a unit root is rejected for the cases
where the p-value < 0.1. Statistical test results based on regression equations with sum of the
macroprudential policy choices included as the index value.
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C Macroprudential Policy Implementation in the
Sample
Country Date of implementation Policy Implemented
Croatia 2006-Q4 LTV
Czech Republic 2015-Q2 LTV, Loan Restrictions
Denmark 2003-Q2 Loan Restrictions
Estonia 2015-Q1 LTV, Loan Restrictions, DSTI
Finland 2010-Q1 LTV




Poland 2006-Q4 Loan Restrictions
Portugal 2018-Q3 LTV, Loan Restrictions, DSTI
Slovakia 2014-Q4 LTV
Slovenia 2016-Q3 LTV, DSTI
Spain 2009-Q1 Loan Restrictions
Sweden 2004-Q3 LTV
United Kingdom 2009-Q1 Loan Restrictions
Note: Date of rst implementation of macroprudential policy for every country in our sample
and brief description of the policy.
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D Description of Control and Treated Groups




































Note: Treated and control group members for the full sample, pre-crisis sample and the post-
crisis sample. A country is assigned to the control group when the country has not implemented
macroprudential policy and does not implement macroprudential policy at any point during the
sample period. A country is assigned to the treatment group when the country has implemented
macroprudential policy at some point during the sample period.
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